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This Comment calls for an expansive definition of constructive dis-
charge, proposing a subjective standard which examines the impact on
the individual of the hidden discrimination that courts have often failed
to recognize as a cause of constructive discharge. The doctrine of con-
structive discharge, which allows a victim of discrimination to receive
damages in the form of back pay when she leaves an intolerably or
intentionally discriminatory work environment, is one part of the vast
body of law on the enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 A later development, without specific congressional authoriza-
tion,2 the doctrine of constructive discharge has not evolved to the same
degree as the law under Title VII generally and at present has only
limited applicability to the majority of Title VII cases.
3
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Title VII provides that:
(a) . . . It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1)to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)
2 The courts created the doctrine of constructive discharge by analogy to cases
arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). See
Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44
(5th Cir. 1975); Note, Choosing A Standard For Constructive Discharge in Title VII
Litigation, 71 CORNEi.i. L. REV. 587, 591 (1986).
3 Cf 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 86.50
(1987) (noting that as a result of the exacting standards of the early constructive dis-
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Currently, Title VII effectively remedies and deters the blatant
discrimination once common in the American workplace.4 Similarly,
the doctrine of constructive discharge can provide redress for blatant
discrimination.' However, Title VII can also be effective against both
nonovert and unintentional discrimination through disparate treatment
and disparate impact analyses.
Under the disparate treatment analysis, an employee can make out
a prima facie case of employment discrimination by proving four objec-
tive factors:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seek-
ing applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.6
Although intent is an element of disparate treatment 7 if this prima
facie case is made out, the intent of the employer to discriminate is
presumed.8
Under the disparate impact analysis, a neutral employer policy
may be found to be in violation of Title VII if statistics demonstrate
charge cases, the doctrine had little importance in discrimination cases). This Comment
suggests that, under the current standards, the applicability of the constructive dis-
charge doctrine remains too limited.
4 See J. FEAGIN & C. FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE: INSTITU-
TIONAL RACISM AND SEXISM 43 (2d ed. 1986); B. WILLIAMS, B.ACK WORKERS IN AN
INDUSTRIAL SUBURB 10 (1987).
' See, e.g., Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 786 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1986) (age
harassment); Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1984) (sexual harassment);
Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978) (racial harassment); Tay-
lor v. Jones, 489 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (same), affd in relevant part follow-
ing new trial, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court defined disparate
treatment as a situation in which "[tihe employer simply treats some people less favora-
bly than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at 335
n.15. The McDonnell Douglas test has been modified to apply to various employment
practices including compensation, promotion, and transfer. See 2 A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, supra note 3, § 50.22.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
8 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); 2 A. LARSON &
L. LARSON, supra note 3, § 50.61. Of course, the employer may rebut the employee's
prima facie case with evidence of nondiscriminatory motivation. See Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON,
supra note 3, § 50.61. If, however, there is direct evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion, the employer must rebut with evidence that the employment decision would have
been the same absent the discrimination. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d
458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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that it adversely affects minority workers.' Employer intent is not an
element; the focus is on the impact of the policy on the worker.1 0
In contrast, constructive discharge requires either a specific intent
by the employer to force the employee to resign"1 or that the employ-
ment conditions be so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be
forced to resign." Intolerable employment conditions are demonstrated
' See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In International Bhd. of
Teamsters, the Supreme Court described disparate impact cases as those which "involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity." 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. In a majority of circuits, the neutral practices
may include subjective, as well as objective, employment practices if the plaintiffs prove
the causal connection between those practices and the disparate impact. See Antonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480 n.1, 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(applying impact analysis to subjective criteria, following the Second, Third, Sixth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, and noting conflicting results in
other circuits); Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1339-42 (1987) (discussing the application of
disparate impact to subjective selection procedures).
10 See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
The specific intent requirement reflects the development of the constructive dis-
charge doctrine by analogy to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The con-
structive discharge standard articulated by the National Labor Relations Board in-
cluded the requirement that "the burdens imposed upon the employee must cause, and
be intended to cause, a change in his working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to
force him to resign." Crystal Princeton Ref. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068, 1069 (1976).
Early cases applying constructive discharge adopted this standard, see Muller v. United
States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1975), and
it is still the applicable standard in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. See, e.g., Bristow v.
Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Our decisions require proof
of the employer's specific intent to force an employee to leave."), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1461 (1986); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981)
("To constitute a constructive discharge, the employer's actions must have been taken
with the intention of forcing the employee to quit."). For a discussion of the employer
intent standard for constructive discharge cases and its evolution from NLRA cases, see
Note, supra note 2, at 588-91; Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and
the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 561, 566-68 (1986).
12 The reasonable employee standard, originally articulated by the First Circuit in
a first amendment case, Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977), requires a
finding "that the new working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant
that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign."
Id. at 119. The standard was applied to constructive discharge in the Title VII context
and further refined by the Fifth Circuit in Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d
61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring aggravating factors to prove the existence of an
intolerable work environment), and is followed by the Second, see Pena v. Brattleboro
Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1983), Third, see Goss v. Exxon Office Sys.,
747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984), Sixth, see Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427,
432 (6th Cir. 1982), Ninth, see Noland v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir.
1982), Tenth, see Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986), Elev-
enth, see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907 (11th Cir. 1982), and District
of Columbia, see Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Circuits.
For a discussion of the development of the reasonable employee standard, see Note,
supra note 2, at 598-604; Comment, supra note 11, at 563-66. This Comment con-
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by aggravating factors which accompany the discrimination," com-
monly harassment. 4 Thus, a victim of employment discrimination may
be in the anomalous position of being able to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under either a disparate impact or disparate
treatment standard but unable to establish constructive discharge under
the current standards.15 As a result, an employee who quits her job in
the face of discrimination that she finds intolerable is often found to
have left voluntarily, thereby forfeiting any right to equitable relief in
the form of back pay or otherwise. 6
trasts its proposed standard to the majority reasonable employee standard.
IS See Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65-66 (unequal pay alone is not so aggravating that
it would cause a reasonable employee to resign); see also Note, supra note 2, at 604-17
(discussing the development of the Bourque aggravating factors analysis).
14 See, e.g., Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978)
("[Constructive discharge was based upon the salary and merit pay discrepancies...
and upon alleged harassment."); Parker v. Siemens-Allis, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1377,
1389 (E.D. Ark. 1985) ("[Elvidence of continuing discrimination on the basis of sex in
the form of transfers, unequal pay and harassment was presented which would enable
the Court to conclude a constructive discharge took place."); see also supra note 5.
Cases in which the underlying Title VII violation is sexual harassment have re-
ceived considerable recent attention from the courts. In Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986), the Supreme Court's first treatment of sexual harass-
ment in employment, the Court held that sexual harassment was a form of discrimina-
tion prohibited under Title VII. Id. at 2409. Sexual harassment is already recognized
as an aggravating factor for the purposes of constructive discharge, but Vinson may
help develop the law of constructive discharge to include discharge from hidden dis-
crimination. The Vinson Court recognized the link between discrimination and mental
injury necessary to make out a claim of constructive discharge under the subjective
standard proposed by this Comment. The Court approved an expansive interpretation
of Title VII because "'[O]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority group workers.'" Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2405 (quoting Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)). The
same rationale supports this Comment's argument for an expansive definition of con-
structive discharge.
For an in depth discussion of Vinson as well as a thorough review of the literature
and cases relating to sexual harassment, see Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place:
A Consideration of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 67 B.U.L. REV. 445 (1987). See also Note, Sexual Harassment Claims
of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1467 (1984)
("[Clourts should adopt clear standards defining abusive environment sexual
harassment.").
5 This Comment does not suggest that the plaintiff will prevail on her Title VII
claim every time she establishes a prima facie case based on nonovert discrimination.
The employer is free to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory act. See Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Thus, Title VII, too, does not sufficiently combat institutional
racism. The limitations of current law under Title VII is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a criticism of current law under Title VII, see Comment, Title VII
Today: The Shift Away fron Equality, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 525 (1987).
" An employee who quits her job due to discrimination may recover damages in
the form of back pay only if she proves constructive discharge. See, e.g., Muller v.
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By focusing on employer intent or aggravating factors in construc-
tive discharge cases, courts fail to recognize that discrimination can be
subtle, even unintentional, yet have a devastating enough effect on an
employee to force her to resign.1" The existence of hidden "institu-
tional" discrimination is not a novel concept. It has been discussed by
many legal commentators 8 and is the subject of much psychological
and sociological research.' 9
United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 1975) ("Unless [plaintiff] was
constructively discharged, he would not be entitled to damages in the form of back pay
... from the date of leaving the [defendant's] employ."). This is because Title VII
requires mitigation of damages: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). See generally 2 A.
LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 3, § 55.37(c) (discussing the Title VII mitigation
requirement). Thus, in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1122
(D.D.C. 1985), affd in part and rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the
district court awarded the plaintiff only attorney's fees for her successful claim of sex
discrimination because she failed to demonstrate that her resignation was the result of
constructive discharge. The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling on con-
structive discharge and remanded for a determination of appropriate damages and
relief.
17 Because intent is necessary under the disparate treatment analysis, uninten-
tional discrimination may have to be remedied under a disparate impact analysis. See
Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1310-11. However, in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825
F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the District of Columbia Circuit stated that, "[T]he fact
that some or all the partners at Price Waterhouse may have been unaware of that
motivation [to discriminate], even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its exis-
tence nor excuses it." Id. at 469. In Hopkins, the district court found that the plaintiff
made out a prima facie case of disparate treatment that the defendant successfully re-
butted. Id. at 463-64. However, the district court also found direct evidence of discrimi-
nation in the "unconscious sexual stereotyping" which played a role in the partnership
evaluation, and the court of appeals affirmed this finding. Id. at 464, 468.
18 See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling, 17 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 140 (1982) (defining insti-
tutional racism as "the subtle and unconscious racism in schools, hiring decisions, and
the other practices which determine the distribution of social benefits and responsibili-
ties"); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 596 (1977) (defining institutional racism as "another,
more subtle kind of racism-unintentional, perhaps, but effective-which is as much a
part of the legal system as are overt and covert racist laws and practices"); cf. Law-
rence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (discussing the existence and negative effects of
unconscious racism); Spiegelman, Court Ordered Hiring Quotas After Stotts: A Narra-
tive on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment Discrimi-
nation Doctrine, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 371-78 (1985) (describing "victim
group isolation" as the discrimination resulting from the underrepresentation of a
group in the workplace).
19 See Alvarez, Institutional Discrimination in Organizations and Their Envi-
ronments, in DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 2, 2 (1979) (defining institutional
discrimination as "a set of social processes through which organizational decision mak-
ing, either implicitly or explicitly, results in a clearly identifiable population receiving
fewer psychic, social, or material rewards per quantitative and/or qualitative unit of
performance than a clearly identifiable comparison population within the same organi-
19881
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In examining charges of constructive discharge, courts should
abandon the employer intent or reasonable person test in favor of a
subjective standard that can take into account the effect of nonovert,
"institutional" racism on the individual employee. This effect may be
demonstrated where the employee suffers from adverse physical or psy-
chological symptoms as a result of the discrimination.20 Thus, under
this standard, a victim of a Title VII violation who is forced to leave a
workplace intolerably contaminated by nonovert "institutional" dis-
crimination may receive equitable relief in the form of back pay or
other relief under the doctrine of constructive discharge.
This Comment discusses current employment discrimination law,
utilizes sociological and psychological studies, and borrows from work-
men's compensation law to create a new standard for constructive dis-
charge. Part I illustrates the current anomalous situation whereby
plaintiffs can prove a violation of Title VII but not constructive dis-
charge and proposes a new standard to redress this situation. Part II
develops a mode of proof to meet the proposed standard, describing in-
stitutional discrimination and how its potential negative physical and
psychological impact can result in constructive discharge. Part III dis-
cusses causation and the nexus between the institutional discrimination
and its negative impact on the employee necessary to prove constructive
discharge under the proposed standard.
I. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT LAW TO REDRESS CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE FROM INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
A plaintiff who is the victim of a Title VII violation may be com-
pelled to leave her place of work by the negative effects of an atmo-
sphere of discrimination, the existence of which courts currently do not
recognize. The following interview with a black managerial employee
provides one example of how institutional discrimination may result in
zational constraints"); Barbarin, Community Competence: An Individual Systems
Model of Institutional Racism, in INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPE-
TENCE 6, 8 (1981) (comparing overt racism, "observable behavior of a white individual
or community," with institutional racism, "organizational or system processes, behav-
iors, policies, or procedures, which produce negative outcomes for nonwhites relative to
those for whites"); cf. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 11 (describing "subtle, informal
types of discrimination" as manifested in terms and conditions of employment, dis-
charge, and promotion); J. WORK, RACE, ECONOMICS, AND CORPORATE AMERICA 26
(1984) (defining racism as "a set of institutionalized and negative social values, .
whether expressed within or outside of institutions by individual whites or groups, .
which serves to foreclose full and equal access to socioeconomic and political
institutions").
20 See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
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constructive discharge:
After Ken Rhodes' supervisor ignored the due date for
his annual performance review last year, the 24-year-old au-
ditor for a major Manhattan bank began to worry. Past re-
views indicated the Howard University graduate's exemplary
performance, yet two white colleagues with the same senior-
ity were promoted a month before. Surely his promotion
would come soon, he thought. It didn't. According to his su-
pervisor, all promotions would be deferred for four months
due to a departmental reorganization.
"I knew that was a lie," says Rhodes [not his real
name], his voice rising slightly as he recalled that meeting. "I
knew all promotions were not being deferred." For a fast-
tracker like Rhodes, putting his career on hold was a bitter
pill to swallow. But realizing the repercussions of crying ra-
cism, Rhodes chose not to fight back, eventually becoming
depressed about his job and his career. "It seemed as if no
matter how well I did my job it was all for nothing."2
A plaintiff in Rhodes' situation may be able to make out a prima
facie case of a Title VII violation based on disparate treatment. How-
ever, if depression resulting from this Title VII violation forces her to
leave her job, she cannot make out a cause of action for constructive
discharge. Under current law, a single Title VII violation such as dis-
criminatory unequal pay, transfer, or failure to promote is generally
insufficient to support a cause of action for constructive discharge ab-
sent proof of employer intent to discharge or aggravating factors creat-
ing an intolerable employment environment.22
A. Judicial Indifference to Mental Injury Caused by
Unequal Pay, Failure to Promote, and Discriminatory Transfer
In the context of unequal pay, the court in Bourque v. Powell
Electrical Manufacturing Co.23 stated: "[D]iscrimination manifesting
itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, be sufficient to support
2 Greene, New Prescriptions for Executive Stress, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug.
1985, at 62, 62. In Rhodes' story, his patience was rewarded when a black woman
replaced his former supervisor and promoted him. Not all tales of discriminatory fail-
ure to promote will have this satisfactory ending.
22 See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. Some courts, however, are start-
ing to take a broader view of constructive discharge. See infra notes 41-54 and accom-
panying text.
23 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
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a finding of constructive discharge.. . . Unequal pay is not a sufficient
justification to relieve [the employee] of her duty to mitigate damages
by remaining on the job." '24 Like unequal pay, "failure to promote, in
and of itself is not sufficient to result in a constructive discharge."25
And, as in other constructive discharge cases, when the underlying Ti-
tle VII violation is discriminatory transfer, the employee must prove
that her transfer would have resulted in intolerable working
conditions.2"
This strict standard for constructive discharge began with Rosado
v. Santiago,27 a case involving constructive discharge based on a first
amendment violation. In Rosado, a social worker alleged that he had
been constructively discharged by means of a retaliatory transfer from
the position of district director in one office to a nondirector position
with equal pay in another after he criticized his immediate superior in
a letter to the regional supervisor.28 In holding that a constructive dis-
charge had occurred, the trial court focused on the diminution of title,
prestige, and duty, and termed Rosado's transfer a demotion.29 The
First Circuit affirmed the finding of retaliatory discharge but reversed
the ruling on constructive discharge, noting that Rosado's new working
conditions were not objectively intolerable.3" In remanding, the court
set forth a strict standard for constructive discharge, stating that the
"limited blow to one's pride or prestige does not provide reason enough
24 Id. at 65-66; see also Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644
F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (inequality in pay did not "ipso facto" constitute
constructive discharge for a black worker because of "cordial" employment conditions
and the lack of aggravating factors); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157,
1166 (9th Cir. 1981) (employer's discrimination in terms of unequal pay alone would
not be constructive discharge within the purview of Title VII), overruled on other
grounds sub nom. Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir.
1987).
25 Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982); accord
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983) (absent harass-
ment, failure to promote is insufficient as a basis for a claim of constructive discharge),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867
(1984).
21 See supra note 12.
27 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977).
28 Id. at 119.
29 Rosado is important because it is typical. The court of appeals reversed the
district court's finding of a demotion and its holding on constructive discharge, failing to
realize that transfers which are not characterized by the employer as demotions can
entail a significant loss of prestige, duty, or influence. Thus, courts diligently should
attempt to identify and remedy these de facto demotions which offer employers a tacti-
cal means by which to rid themselves of certain employees by imposing intolerable
changes in working conditions.
20 See Rosado, 562 F.2d at 117, 119.
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to resign . . . ." This case was relied on by the court in Bourque for
the development of its aggravating factors analysis.3 2
By refusing to recognize a claim of constructive discharge in the
absence of employer intent or the aggravating factor of harassment, a
court may fail to recognize other very real aggravating factors justifying
constructive discharge. The court in EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank33
summarily rejected "'embarrassment and an unfavorable working envi-
ronment'" as a result of being passed over for promotion as a basis for
constructive discharge, without any consideration that intolerable
mental injury can result.
34
Judicial insensitivity to the potentially damaging psychological ef-
fects of employment discrimination is again apparent in Neale v. Dil-
lon.35 The underlying Title VII claim was failure to promote and
transfer to a nonsupervisory job while the plaintiff was on maternity
lenve_3 6 which the nlaintiff found intnlerqhlv damring to her nrestige.
While the court found no discrimination in violation of Title VII, it
went further and suggested that the plaintiff's personal embarrassment
would not have constituted constructive discharge had discrimination
been found."7 Similarly, in Schaulis v. CTB/McGraw-Hill,3 the court
stated that "[an employer has not effected a constructive discharge
merely because an employee believes that she has . . . limited opportu-
nities for advancement . . .,,9
Of course, not all plaintiffs claiming emotional harm will be able
to prove its existence or its relation to discrimination. In Rosado, the
court wisely considered the public policy issues which require that em-
ployees not be allowed to walk off their jobs whenever they are in-
formed of a transfer that is not to their liking. Some transfers undoubt-
edly are necessary to the operation of business organizations. Indeed, it
31 Id. at 119-20.
" See supra note 12.
3 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
3" Id. at 672. The court's discussion of constructive discharge is dictum. The claim
of constructive discharge was mooted by the fact that the court held that the plaintiff
did not establish an underlying Title VII violation. Id.
11 534 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 714 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
36 Id. at 1386.
37 Id. at 1390. There is a modicum of wisdom in the Neale opinion. In reviewing
the evidence of discriminatory transfer, the court noted that the plaintiff's new position
was not generally perceived as lacking in prestige and that transfer from a supervisory
position in one department to a nonsupervisory position in another was both common-
place and nonstigmatizing in the particular workplace. Id.
38 496 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that the plaintiff failed to make
out a prima facie case of sex discrimination).
39 Id. at 676.
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is the express province of the employer to make these decisions.4" How-
ever, plaintiffs with real injury causally related to employment discrim-
ination should receive redress from the courts.
B. Toward Recognizing Constructive Discharge
from Mental Injury
To provide redress for constructive discharge manifested as mental
injury from discrimination, courts need not radically depart from cur-
rent law governing constructive discharge. Courts simply need to adopt
a more expansive view of what may constitute an aggravating factor.
Just as harassment itself may be both the Title VII violation and the
cause of constructive discharge, courts must recognize that a Title VII
violation such as discriminatory unequal pay, transfer, or failure to
promote may also create an intolerable working environment through
its effect on the mental health of the plaintiff.
Courts have already begun to realize that they must recognize the
effects of discrimination on the individual victim. In Schneider v. Jax
Shack, Inc., 1 the Eighth Circuit, which ordinarily applies an employer
intent standard,42 focused instead on the impact of the constructive dis-
charge on the employee.43 Although the court was concerned with an
economic impact,44 the shift in focus from the subjective employer in-
tent to the impact on the individual employee suggests that the Eighth
Circuit is expanding its view of what may constitute constructive
discharge.
With Goss v. Exxon Office Systems,4 5 the Third Circuit also
presented a broad view of what factors are relevant to constructive dis-
charge. In Goss, a female sales representative claimed sex discrimina-
tion resulting in a discriminatory transfer. The court held that Goss
0 See Rosado, 562 F.2d at 119:
Unless the transfer is, in effect, a discharge, the employee has no right
simply to walk out; he must accept the orders of his superior, even if felt
to be unjust, until relieved of them by judicial or administrative action.
Were this not so, a public employee would be encouraged to set himself up
as the judge of every grievance; and the public taxpayer would end up
paying for periods of idleness while the grievance was being adjudicated.
4' 794 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1986).
See Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981).
'3 The court found the impact to be great enough to constitute an actual dis-
charge. Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384-85.
"" "Employers should not be able to avoid responsibility for discriminatory dis-
charges by first demoting employees to part-time or fill-in status or by stringing out
employees' tenures with nebulous commitments until the employees for their own eco-
nomic well-being must 'quit.'" Id. at 385.
45 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
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had been constructively discharged, noting not only that the transfer
was a move to an inferior work environment involving a substantial cut
in pay,46 but also that the reassignment had shattered the plaintiff's
confidence, an asset essential to her performance as a saleswoman.
47
Clark v. Marsh48 sounds a particularly hopeful note. Clark is one
of the few cases in which courts have found a constructive discharge
when the plaintiff's primary allegation was discriminatory failure to
promote.49 Clark retired because she was not promoted to a position for
which she was qualified and to which she was the logical successor.
The court found that Clark's retirement amounted to constructive dis-
charge because: 1) she had been the victim of a "continuous pattern of
discriminatory treatment encompassing deprivation of opportunities for
promotion, lateral transfer, and increased educational training"; 2) she
reasonably expected numerous opportunities for advancement; and 3)
she had "vigorously pursued" these opportunities to no avail.50 Most
importantly, the court observed that "the predictable humiliation and
loss of prestige accompanying her failure to obtain this particular posi-
tion constitute[d] the 'aggravating factors' required by Bourque.""1
Clark represents a step forward for the law of constructive dis-
charge for three reasons. First, the court emphasized the humiliation
48 Central to the issue of whether a transfer constitutes constructive discharge in
many cases is whether the transfer is tantamount to a substantial demotion. While
demotion is not by any means an essential element, courts are far more likely to find
for the employee if the transfer is a demotion in disguise. Compare Thompson v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding no constructive
discharge where the transfer actually gave the plaintiff a better chance at promotion)
with Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding demo-
tion and constructive discharge), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977).
C" oss, 747 F.2d at 888-89 (citing and approving district court finding). See also
EEOC v. Hay Associates, 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1085-87 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that
sex discrimination in the forms of failure to promote, unequal pay, and false attribution
of the plaintiff's work to male colleagues was sufficient to establish intolerable working
conditions resulting in constructive discharge).
48 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
4' The plaintiff in Clark, an army-employee, alleged that she was denied promo-
tion on the basis of sex and was the victim of retaliatory action for having filed a formal
complaint of employment discrimination against the Army. See Clark v. Alexander, 489
F. Supp. 1236, 1238, 1243 (D.D.C. 1980), affd in relevant part sub nom. Clark v.
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
50 Clark, 665 F.2d at 1174.
5I Id. at 1175-76, This recognition represents a departure from the tendency of
many courts not to discuss subjective mental impact and to examine only objective evi-
dence of harassment as an aggravating factor or the cause of an intolerable workplace
environment. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The doctrine of constructive
discharge also has expanded outside of the context of Title VII. See Parrett v. City of
Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding constructive discharge due to
humiliation and mental injury in a § 1983 case in which the employee was given no
work at all to do in his empty, windowless office).
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associated with nonpromotion and explicitly identified it as an aggra-
vating factor in constructive discharge. Although the court conceded
that some embarrassment and loss of prestige are predictable in a fail-
ure to promote case, it nonetheless viewed these factors as highly signif-
icant. 2 In contrast, most courts have viewed embarrassment as part
and parcel of nonpromotion and have not considered it an aggravating
circumstance in the context of a constructive discharge. 53 Second, the
court recognized the importance of Clark's "vigorous pursuit" of suc-
cess. This vigorous pursuit of success resulted in constant frustration to
Clark and contributed to what ultimately became intolerable working
conditions. Such a finding should help employees who, after devoting
substantial physical and psychological energies to their jobs, find that
the denial of an expected promotion makes life in their workplace intol-
erable. Third, the Clark court employed a subjective analysis, giving
weight to Clark's expectation of promotion. The fact that Clark justifi-
ably believed that she would receive a promotion helped her to establish
the intolerability of her present position. Generally, an employee's indi-
vidual expectations are not considered in the constructive discharge
context.54
Thus, Clark represents a meaningful step forward for minority
employees. The expansive view in Clark of what may constitute an
aggravating factor should be adopted by all the circuit courts of
appeals.
Despite an emphasis on the individual, rather than the objective
"reasonable" employee, the expansion of the concept of aggravating
"2 Clark had achieved worldwide recognition in her capacity as acting director of
the Army Office of Employment Policy and Grievance Review. Clark, 665 F.2d at
1175. It is possible that the court took into account the far-reaching scope of her humil-
iation in characterizing it as an aggravating circumstance. This factor should not serve
as a limitation for less influential Title VII plaintiffs. The geographical reaches of a
former employee's embarrassment should not be determinative of whether her depar-
ture is recognized as a constructive discharge.
53 See, e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983)
(employee's allegation that "embarrassment and unfavorable working environment" re-
sulted from being passed over in promotion is insufficient for constructive discharge
claim (dictum)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank,
467 U.S. 867 (1984).
"' The standard is whether a "reasonable" employee would consider the employ-
ment conditions intolerable. See supra note 12. In Clark, the District of Columbia
Circuit relied on the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of opportunities for advance-
ment. 655 F.2d at 1174. Similarly, in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458
(D.C. Cir. 1987), the court relied on the fact that the failure to promote "would have
been viewed by any reasonable senior manager as a career-ending action." Id. at 473
(emphasis added). However, in both cases the District of Columbia shifted from the
objective to the subjective reasonable person by examining the impact of discrimination
on the individual employee.
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factors to include the mental health impact of hidden discrimination
does not condone a situation in which "a public employee would be
encouraged to set himself up as the judge of every grievance, and the
public taxpayer would end up paying for periods of idleness while the
grievance was being adjudicated. ' 55 Instead, a plaintiff must demon-
strate constructive discharge in a three-part test. First, the plaintiff
must prove the discrimination resulting in the underlying Title VII vio-
lation. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate the intolerable effects of
that discrimination. Finally, she must establish a nexus between the
discrimination and the symptoms which make her employment intoler-
able. Parts II and III of this Comment develop these three steps.
II. DEMONSTRATING THE EXISTENCE AND IMPACT OF
INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
Although a Title VII claim may be made with circumstantial
proof of discrimination through disparate treatment or disparate im-
pact,56 before a court will remedy a constructive discharge created by
institutional discrimination, the plaintiff must convince the court that
such discrimination exists. Professor Lawrence approaches the problem
of demonstrating hidden discrimination in his article on unconscious
racism with a review of the psychological literature on the causes of
racism5" and anecdotes of racism in everyday life.58 Professor
Spiegelman instead provides a review of the sociological literature con-
cerning the effects of isolation on minorities in organizations. 59 To
prove constructive discharge by institutional discrimination, a plaintiff
must prove both that the employment environment is discriminatory
and that this discrimination has made the employment environment in-
tolerable to the individual plaintiff.
A claim of constructive discharge must be based on an underlying
violation of Title VII. The underlying violation may be either harass-
ment6" or a discriminatory condition of employment such as unequal
11 Rosado, 562 F.2d at 119.
51 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
57 See Lawrence, supra note 18, at 331-39. Professor Lawrence proposes an equal
protection approach to institutional discrimination designed to help courts recognize
race-based behavior for the imposition of strict scrutiny. His test asks courts to look for
the cultural meaning behind an allegedly racially discriminatory act. Id. at 324.
58 Id. at 339-44.
51 Spiegelman, supra note 18, at 371-78. Professor Spiegelman argues for a rem-
edy in employment discrimination cases that will remove the institutional structures
which cause discrimination in the first place. Thus, his test requires courts to recognize
that employment discrimination can result in "victim group isolation" which mere rein-
statement or damages in the form of back pay will not remedy. Id. at 362-71.
6 See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2409 (1986); see also
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pay, discriminatory failure to promote, or discriminatory transfer.6' In
both types of Title VII cases, courts should recognize that the Title VII
violation itself may be evidence of further, pervasive institutional dis-
crimination that can give rise to aggravating factors supporting a claim
of constructive discharge.
A. Demonstrating the Existence of Institutional
Discrimination in the Work Environment
Proving the existence of institutional discrimination empirically is
difficult. Anecdotal reports are helpful.6 2 One can also point to studies
pointing out differentials in wages"3 or upward mobility,64 but these
studies are merely consistent with the existence of discrimination. They
do not prove its existence.
Because multiple factors may explain differentially negative
outcomes and because most people are ufiable or unwilling
to acknowledge their own racial practices, the existence of
institutional racism cannot be proved in the strictest sense
but must be inferred on the basis of observed differences in
the treatment or status of whites and nonwhites.65
supra note 14 (discussing Vinson).
el See supra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Jones, Black Managers: The Dream Deferred, HARV. Bus. REv.,
May-June 1986, at 84; Good News, Bad News, and an "Invisible Ceiling", FOR-
TUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 29.
" See McDonough, Snider & Kaufman, Male-Female and White-Minority Pay
Differentials in a Research Organization, in DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS,
supra note 19, at 123; see also R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE
GAP 57-81, 195-98 (1984) (examining earnings differentials between whites and blacks
from 1959 to 1979 and concluding that the continued differential between black and
white men is the result of continued discrimination). But see Medoff, Discrimination
and the Occupational Progress of Blacks Since 1950, 41 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 295,
302 (1985) (finding substantial improvement in the occupational position of blacks rel-
ative to whites between 1950 and 1980).
See generally Pomer, Labor Market Structure, Intragenerational Mobility,
and Discrimination: Black Male Advancement out of Low-Paying Occupations, 1962-
1973, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 650, 657 (1986) (finding limited upward mobility for black
men and noting that this is "consistent with the possibility that discrimination against
blacks permeates the United States labor market"). Scholars do not unanimously agree
that current racial discrimination is responsible for the current disparity in the labor
market between the positions of blacks and whites. See W. WILSON, THE DECLINING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 144-54
(2d ed. 1980) (noting both the status improvement of some blacks and the accompany-
ing growing black urban underclass and concluding that this is the result of class, not
racial, bias).
" Barbarin, Community Competence: An Individual Systems Model of Institu-
tional Racism, in INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE, supra
note 19, at 6, 9.
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Thus, despite the lack of empirical proof, evidence sufficient to
demonstrate institutional discrimination may be inferred from evidence
of stereotyping, tracking, and career ceilings.
Finding institutional discrimination from such evidence does re-
quire an inquiry into an employer's subjective criteria for pay, promo-
tion, or transfer. However, courts traditionally defer to employer judg-
ment on subjective criteria and their application to individual
employees in Title VII litigation. 6 Furthermore, some courts empha-
size the importance of subjectivity in the promotion process and there-
fore maintain a "hands off" approach regarding employee evaluations.
In Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System, 17 the plaintiff, a female zoology professor, alleged sex discrimi-
nation in her tenure denial. The Seventh Circuit, while acknowledging
the possibility of discrimination, upheld the faculty committee's discre-
tion in tenure evaluations. In finding for the defendant, the court held
that the judicial system is constrained in determining the significance or
validity of the committee's conclusion that one tenure applicant has aca-
demic potential and another does not.68 But the court conceded that
allowing the decisionmakers to act as the ultimate judges of qualifica-
tion "would ordinarily defeat the purpose of the discrimination laws."6
The Namenwirth court also acknowledged the importance of peer es-
teem in securing tenure.70 Such an endorsement, however, potentially
invites discrimination. As the dissent recognized, an inherent problem
exists in the majority's analysis, "given that the dispositive factor in
such decisions is the ability of the candidate to win the esteem of the
very people whose sexual biases are in question. '7 1 While hesitating to
second-guess tenure decisions, the dissent defended the notion that the
majority abandoned-albeit reluctantly-that the university's evalua-
tion of an employee's potential "is not different in kind from any other
employer's judgment of potential.
'7 2
In contrast, courts view subjective employment criteria in the blue-
collar context with suspicion. The landmark case in this area, Rowe v.
General Motors73 establishes some guidelines for blue-collar employ-
8 See Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the
White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45, 46-49 (1979); see
also 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 50.70-.80 (discussing special
problems of proof for professional employees).
87 769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
88 See id. at 1242-43.
69 Id. at 1243.
70 See id. at 1242.
71 Id. at 1244 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1248 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
73 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of Rowe, see generally Wain-
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ers. In Rowe, the plaintiff was a janitor at an automotive plant who
alleged discriminatory denial of a promotion from an hourly to a sala-
ried position. In finding for the plaintiff, the court held that General
Motors' promotion criteria violated Title VII in five respects: 1) a fore-
man's recommendation was the most important and indispensible re-
quirement in the process; 2) foremen received no written instructions
concerning qualifications; 3) the standards that were controlling were
vague and subjective; 4) hourly employees were not notified of promo-
tion opportunities or requisite qualifications; and 5) no safeguards were
implemented to deter discriminatory practices.
74
Courts should approach subjective criteria with the same suspicion
in the white-collar context. As the Namenwirth dissent pointed out, the
danger of discrimination allowed by subjective criteria is possible at any
employment level.75 This approach requires an examination of the ef-
fects of employment discrimination on the individual employee, not the
"reasonable person." An obvious objection is the injection of subjectivity
into the court's review of employment discrimination, an approach
seemingly rejected by the Court's focus on objective factors in its analy-
sis of disparate treatment and disparate impact..7  This objection is in-
apposite. Courts already review subjective matters in employment dis-
crimination cases. Title VII appliei to white-collar employees whose
employment conditions are necessarily based on subjective evaluation
processes.7 7 Indeed, even when applying the disparate impact analysis,
a majority of circuits are willing to review subjective employment crite-
ria.7" Subjective factors should be closely examined by courts to deter-
mine if there is a Title VII violation because "high-level subjectivity
subjects the ultimate [employment] decision to the intolerable occur-
troob, supra note 66, at 48-49.
7' Rowe, 457 F.2d at 358-59.
See Namenwirth, 769 F.2d at 1248 (Swygert, J., dissenting); see also Bartholet,
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 947 (1982)
(arguing that there is no legal basis for distinguishing between upper- and lower-level
selection methods in applying Title VII). But see Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level
Employment-A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 776, 777 (1983)
(arguing that strict review of subjective criteria in the professional workplace would
impose overly stringent burdens on employers).
7 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that Title VII is
applicable to a law firm partnership decision). Because white-collar employees are fre-
quently hired, fired, promoted, demoted, transferred, and assigned salary levels based
on highly subjective criteria, the employer/employee relationship is subject to an espe-
cially high probability of bias contamination. As such, subjectivity is a particularly cru-
cial concern in the white-collar environment. "Bias contamination," as used in this
Comment, refers to the intentional or unintentional influence of prejudicial considera-
tion that has an impact on the decision of an employer.
7" See Antonio v. Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
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rence of conscious or unconscious prejudice." 9 Furthermore, an exami-
nation of only objective factors may blind the court to the presence of
the nonovert discrimination which exists in both white- and blue-collar
workplaces.80
In scrutinizing the subjective criteria used to determine employ-
ment conditions, courts should be particularly alert when presented
with evidence of bias contamination demonstrating institutional
discrimination.
1. Stereotyping
Unconscious discrimination may take the form of stereotypes about
the employee's race. This "colorism,"' as the phenomenon is termed
by one commentator, may influence personnel decisions as much as ob-
jective criteria. In a nonracist society, race would function like eye
color.8 2 However, in our culture, this is not the case:
Eye color is an irrelevant category; nobody cares what color
people's eyes are; it is not an important cultural fact; nothing
turns on what eye color you have. It is important to see that
race is not like that at all. And this truth affects what will
and will not count as cases of racism. In our culture, to be
nonwhite-and especially to be black-is to be treated and
seen to be a member of a group that is different from and
inferior to the group of standard, fully developed persons,
Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir. 1976) (blue-
collar context), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); see also Antonio, 810 F.2d at 1481
(applying disparate impact analysis to subjective employment criteria in blue-colloar
context because "subjective practices are particularly susceptible to discriminatory
abuse and should be closely scrutinized"); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv.,
528 F.2d 508, 514, 518 (5th Cir. 1976) (in white-collar context, upholding trial court's
finding that subjective questions on evaluation form were vulnerable to conscious or
unconscious discrimination by evaluating supervisors); Rowe, 457 F.2d at 359 (holding
that promotion or transfer procedures that depend on subjective evaluation are a ready
mechanism for discrimination in blue-collar context).
80 Although promotions in "upper-level" employment are generally based primar-
ily upon subjective, discretionary, and intangible qualities, such as judgment, leader-
ship, initiative, and sensitivity, and "lower-level" promotions are generally based on
objective, skills-related, objective criteria, see Note, Title VII and Employment Discrim-
ination in "Upper Level" jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1614, 1614 (1973), subjectivity as
a result of institutional discrimination is present at the blue-collar level as well. See,
e.g., Antonio, 810 F.2d 1477 (examining discrimination through subjective employment
criteria in a cannery); B. WILLIAMS, supra note 4 (an empirical study of the institu-
tional discrimination present in one suburban factory).
"' "Colorism" is an attitude or predisposition to act in a certain manner based on
a person's skin color, the actor treating her own race favorably and other races unfavor-
ably. See Jones, supra note 62, at 88.
82 Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 604.
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the adult white males."3
Despite efforts to eliminate employment discrimination, supervi-
sors continue to embrace a double standard when evaluating minori-
ties 4 and women.8 5 Where such a double standard exists, the "stan-
dard" employee-the adult white male-benefits. For example, an
employer may promote or reward a standard employee because she
genuinely believes that the employee is "more articulate, .... more colle-
gial," ' or "more charismatic" than another.8" As a result, employees
who overcome these latent negative presumptions at the hiring phase
must still contend with them when they are being considered for pro-
motions or merit raises later in their employment.
Employers typically reject any allegation that they harbor uncon-
scious prejudice toward an employee. They may assert in their defense
that they really don't think of their employee as black (or Jewish or
Hispanic, etc.).88 These kinds of statements, although meant as compli-
ments, are nevertheless injurious in that they suggest that: 1) the em-
ployer unconsciously associates negative attributes with the employee's
group, although she has exempted the particular employee from these
attributes; and 2) the employer has a predisposition not to hire, pro-
mote, or otherwise reward a member of the employee's group, but that
she has overcome this predisposition in the case of the particular em-
ployee. The mere fact that such a predisposition exists, however uncon-
sciously, diminishes the likelihood of equal employment opportunity for
minorities and women.8 9
83 Id. at 586. This statement applies to sex and ethnicity as well as race.
84 One white consultant observed that "'the same qualities that are rewarded in
white managers become the reason the black manager is disliked and penalized.'"
Jones, supra note 62, at 88. Aggressiveness, generally perceived as a valuable trait in
the corporate world, is often characterized as arrogance in black workers. Conversely,
employees who are not aggressive are perceived as lacking assertiveness. See id.
85 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
Hopkins court recognized that the plaintiff suffered from the application of a double
standard. Her assertive behavior was characterized as unfeminine, macho, and lacking
in charm. Id. at 465-68 (approving the district court's findings).
86 It is interesting to note the definition and underlying connotation of the word
"collegial." Webster's Dictionary defines "collegial" as "marked by power or authority
vested equally in each of a number of colleagues." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 218 (1981). The mere fact that an employer selects a word that conveys a
greater feeling of equality between himself and his "colleague" suggests an unconscious
predisposition to view the employee as an equal, an inclination which may not exist in
his evaluation of competent candidates with cultural differences.
87 See Lawrence, supra note 18, at 343.
88 See id. at 318, 341-42 (discussing these types of statements in a broader
context).
89 Overt racists tend to harbor certain types of stereotyped ideas about the "out-
group," i.e., perceiving blacks as lazy, dishonest, stupid, and oversexed, and Jews as
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2. Tracking
Unconscious prejudice may also take the form of stereotypes about
the position.9° In the subconscious contemplation of personnel matters,
these hidden biases play a part in what are often termed "gut reac-
tions" or "instincts" about an individual's compatibility with a particu-
lar position. If the employer unconsciously sees the position as "white,"
this perception may contribute to her assessment of who is an appropri-
ate candidate for the job.91 Similarly, when an employer sees a position
as "male," the perception may spawn discrimination against women.92
Alternatively, minorities and women are often ushered into designated
positions. For example, some employers place blacks in a "black track"
of quasi-respectable but minimally influential roles. Blacks are chan-
nelled into "the relations"-community relations, industrial relations,
and personnel relations 9 -but these "special jobs" are outside of the
mainstream; they have little or no impact on company profits and offer
very little prospect of promotion to top management.94 The situation is
similar for women: "In the worlds of finance, manufacturing, and the
federal government the sharp separation of women into less-well-pay-
ing clerical jobs and men into higher-paying white-collar jobs has been
well documented . .. .95
pushy, conniving, and obsessed with money. See id. at 333; see also Jones, supra note
62, at 88 (A 1982 survey of the class of 1957 from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton
showed that only 55%, 47%, and 36%, respectively, of the respondents believed that
blacks are as intelligent as whites.). These stereotypes exist in and unknowingly emerge
from the "nonracist" in the form of subtle, often imperceptible biases.
90 See J. FEAGIN & C. FEAGIN, supra note 4, at 63-64 (noting tracking in both
the white- and blue-collar context).
91 See Note, supra note 80, at 1629 (explaining that employers in traditionally
white-male professions may unknowingly gauge females and minorities against a stere-
otyped image of the profession and reach the conclusion that "they lack the intangible
qualities indicative of professional aptitude and competence").
92 See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In noting
that limited contacts with an individual in a traditionally male profession may foster
unconscious stereotyping, the district court said, "A far more subtle process [than inten-
tional discrimination] is involved when one who is in a distinct minority may be viewed
differently by the majority because the individual deviates from an artificial standard-
ized profile." 617 F. Supp. 1109, 1118 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd in part and affld in
part, 825 F.2d 458.
9' See Jones, supra note 62, at 89. See also Stevens & Marquette, Black MBAs:
Room at the Top?, MBA, Aug./Sept. 1978, at 41.
9' See G. DAVIS & G. WATSON, BLACK LIFE IN CORPORATE AMERICA: SWIM-
MING IN THE MAINSTREAM 19 (1982). The law does not require merely that there be
equal opportunity for all employees to advance, but also that they not be segregated in
a manner that keeps members of certain groups from positions along any promotion
"track." See Note, supra note 80, at 1620.
11 J. FEAGIN & C. FEAGIN, supra note 4, at 64.
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3. Employment Ceilings
For minority and women employees, biased subjectivity in promo-
tion evaluations may also result in a low employment "ceiling."96 Like
the evaluations that often impose it, the ceiling is in many cases a man-
ifestation of bias contamination. Generally, severe restriction on ad-
vancement in an organization alone does not constitute constructive dis-
charge because courts primarily consider working conditions and the
presence of workplace harassment as the primary factors in the proof of
constructive discharge.9 7 These factors, however, do not exclusively ac-
count for the adverse impact on the employee-the emotional and phys-
ical distress created by the halted advancement.98
Studies have shown that even the most confident and indispensable
minority employees have reason to question the likelihood of ever
reaching upper-level positions in their organizations.99 Thus, aspiring
minorities can be victimized by a rising roadblock. Even the sincere
efforts and support of high-level staffers may fail to thwart minority
ceilings. This situation may occur when an ascending executive "takes
along" middle managers as she climbs the corporate ladder. Although
the upper-level supervisor may be committed to the nondiscriminatory
promotion of minorities and women, if the middle manager envisions
them in only lower positions or designated minority jobs, they will suf-
fer the ceiling effect despite the organization's well-intended progressive
policy.100
4. Judicial Recognition of the Existence of Bias Contamination
One court has taken a step in the right direction towards recogniz-
ing hidden discrimination in subjective criteria. In Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse,' the court found a violation of Title VII in the rejection
of a female partnership candidate. In finding the defendant guilty of
sex discrimination, the district court emphasized that the defendant
took no action to make its partners aware of possible stereotypes that
" A "ceiling" reflects the point at which an employee feels that there is a limited
opportunity for advancement. See Good News, Bad News, and an "Invisible Ceiling",
supra note 62, at 29.
97 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
9' See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
9 See Campbell, Black Executives and Corporate Stress, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 36, 106. See generally Jones, supra note 62, at 84-92 (re-
porting the effects of unconscious, unthinking criteria as impediments to minority pro-
motions, despite the commitment of top executives to fairness and promotion of quali-
fied minorities).
"'0 See Stevens & Marquette, supra note 93, at 42.
101 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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could color their evaluation of partnership candidates. 0 2
Despite finding the existence of sex discrimination, the district
court held that the employee did not establish the aggravating factors
necessary to prove constructive discharge.' 0 3 On appeal, the circuit
court reversed this holding, finding that the "decision to deny Hopkins
partnership status ...coupled with [her department's] failure to re-
nominate her, would have been viewed by any reasonable senior man-
ager in her position as a career-ending action"" 4 and thus resulted in
constructive discharge.
The dissent, while agreeing with the majority's treatment of re-
lief,'0 5 disagreed with the finding of a Title VII violation based on ster-
eotyping, claiming that the record "provided no causal connection be-
tween Hopkins' fate and such stereotyping.' 0 6 The dissent felt that,
"though some forms of sexual stereotyping can be discriminatory, the
instances here . . . were at most 'generalized discrimination within the
employment unit' rather than discrimination 'in the particular employ-
ment decision for which retroactive relief was sought.' "107 Contrary to
what the dissent averred, the causal relationship in Hopkins between
the generalized discrimination and the action for which relief was
sought was established by the plaintiff's expert on sexual stereotyp-
ing.'0 8 Similarly, expert testimony can establish the nexus between hid-
den discrimination and mental injury resulting in constructive
discharge.' 09
B. Demonstrating the Impact of Institutional Discrimination
on the Individual Employee
The above examples of bias contamination may demonstrate to a
court that institutional discrimination exists, but a plaintiff who quits
her job because of such discrimination must prove that her constructive
discharge was truly an involuntary result of an unbearable
environment.
.02 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1118-19 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd in part and affd in part,
825 F.2d 458.
103 Id. at 1121. The plaintiff dropped her allegations of harassment and retalia-
tion before trial. Id.
104 825 F.2d at 473.
105 Id. at 473 n.1 (Williams, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 474 (Williams, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366-
67 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis omitted)).
108 Id. at 469.
'09 See infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
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1. The Intolerable Effects of Institutional Discrimination
Professor Spiegelman has noted the negative effects of institutional
discrimination in his concept of "victim group isolation," the "disad-
vantages which befall an individual member of an identifiably different
minority in an organization. '"" 0 The experience of being in an "out-
group" increases ordinary employment pressures."'
One effect may be an intolerable increase in stress. Stress can be
defined as "any circumstance, situation or event that causes or acceler-
ates the development of human emotional or physical disability or dis-
ease." ' 2 Although seldom recognized as such in the Title VII context,
stress can act as both a result of an intolerable working condition and
as the proximate cause of the constructive discharge. The negative ef-
fects of stress in the workplace on the mental health of the worker are
well documented. 1  Indeed,
the most common symptoms [of occupational stress] in order
of decreasing frequency are: (1) anxiety and/or neurosis (25
percent); (2) depression (20 percent); (3) stress-related, psy-
chosomatic disorders (headache, low back pain, hypertension,
gastrointestinal tract) (15 percent); (4) alcohol and other
drug abuse (15 percent); (5) situational adjustment problems
(e.g., divorce, finances, death in the family) (10 percent); and
(6) other disorders (e.g., severe mental and/or physical'mor-
bidity or mortality) (15 percent).1 1 4
Another researcher has identified the stress facing many employ-
ees, particularly those in managerial positions, as being derived from
concern about career prospects (promotability), the organizational
structure and climate (how well she "fits in"), interpersonal relations at
work, and the employee's role in the organization."15 Problems in any
of these areas may bring about ill-health.'
Of course, stress is not the exclusive problem of minority employ-
ees. Stress occurs at both the white-collar and blue-collar levels and is
common in many occupations." 7 However, where the stress is the re-
110 Spiegelman, supra note 18, at 371.
"I See id. at 371-73 & nn.90-91.
112 Seltzer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 951, 951 (1971).
"13 See, e.g., K. PELLETIER, HEALTHY PEOPLE IN UNHEALTHY PLACES: STRESS
AND FITNESS AT WORK 39-84 (1984).
114 Id. at 48-49.
115 C. COOPER, PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 202 (1981).
216 See K. PELLETIER, supra note 113, at 39-84.
117 See id. at 43-46.
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sult of an illegal activity, such as employment discrimination, courts
should recognize their ability to remedy the injury under Title VII.
For minority workers in the white-collar workplace, the adverse
effects of the work environment are magnified. Because of their small
numbers and consequent high visibility, minority workers are con-
stantly aware that they are being closely monitored."' 8 A study of black
MBAs revealed the following: ninety percent viewed the organizational
climate as worse for them than for their peers; forty-one percent further
described that climate as "patronizing"; eighty-four percent felt that
their workplace was "psychologically unhealthy."" 9 Only fifteen per-
cent, however, characterized their offices as "supportive." 2 ° These sta-
tistics support the notion that the stressful environment resulting from
unequal pay, unlawful transfer, and failure to promote can render the
workplace intolerable.
Cultural differences often result in a shortage of "stress repellents"
for minorities. Studies have found a significant positive correlation be-
tween an employee's close relationship with her supervisor and reduced
job pressure.1 21 Similar benefit flows from close relationships with col-
leagues.122 Often, black or female employees are placed in designated
minority positions or other high-profile/low-influence slots, resulting in
a conflict between formal and actual power.12 This role ambiguity can
manifest itself in the form of greater futility, increased job-related ten-
sion, and lower self-confidence. 24
Blacks are prone to certain stress-related ailments in addition to
those that plague workers in general. Of the thirty-five million people
suffering from hypertension or high blood pressure, blacks are at twice
the risk of whites.1 25 Thus, repressed anger and anxiety may have more
damaging psychological effects on black workers, possibly resulting in
constructive discharge. Nevertheless, courts have not yet recognized the
possibility that seemingly voluntary resignations by minority and
women employees actually may be constructive discharges in which the
employees were forced to quit in order to maintain or recover their
good health.
118 See Campbell, supra note 99, at 39.
119 See Jones, supra note 62, at 86.
120 Id. at 86.
121 C. COOPER, supra note 115, at 207.
122 Id. at 208.
122 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
124 See C. COOPER, supra note 115, at 204-05.
125 See Campbell, supra note 99, at 102, 104 (quoting National High Blood Pres-
sure Information Center statistics).
19881
964 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
2. The Intolerable Effects of Unequal Pay, Failure to Promote,
and Discriminating Transfer
Not only does institutional discrimination itself create intolerable
conditions for employees, but the resulting unequal pay, failure to pro-
mote, or unjustified transfer may also be devastating. For example,
with many employees, failure to promote can be more than a mere
setback or slight disappointment. An employee who has reached a ceil-
ing-the point beyond which she will not be promoted-may suffer
frustration and anger when her optimum work yields no further re-
wards.'26 Similarly, a transfer that is in reality a demotion can have an
adverse impact on an employee's estimation of her own competence.
127
Failure then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The situation created
by forcing a deserving employee to remain in her current position can
create not just a workplace that the employee would rather abandon,
but also an environment that she is compelled to leave.
Like proving the existence of institutional discrimination itself, the
link between discrimination and stress is difficult to prove empirically.
All individuals are faced with many stresses, of which discrimination
may be just one. However, the fact that discrimination causes stress
with both mental and physical repercussions is beyond question.' 28
Indeed, a recent article, written jointly by a professor of psychiatry
at Yale Medical School and the Dean of DePaul University College of
Law, calls for more research "studying how racial discrimination
brings about psychological injury. ' The authors trace the legal devel-
opment of claims based on mental suffering and note the dearth of
medical research "to elucidate the effects of short-term contact with dis-
128 See, e.g., P. BENNER, STRESS AND SATISFACTION ON THE JOB 113-20 (1984)
(describing a paradigm case of an individual who found the disappointment of being
passed over for a promotion unbearable).
12 See Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1984) (dis-
criminatory transfer and demotion of a sales representative resulted in her loss of confi-
dence in herself and her employer and detracted from her ability to perform her sales
function).
128 See R. JONES, BLACK PSYCHOLOGY 359-400 (2d. ed. 1980); Bowser, Racism
and Mental Health: An Exploration of the Racist's Illness and the Victim's Health, in
INSTIrUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE, supra note 65, at 107, 110-
12 (discussing the adverse effects of racism on mental health and blacks' mechanisms
for coping); Cash, Extra-Dimensional Systemic Frustrations That Endanger the
Mental Health of Black People, in KEY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN THE BLACK
COMMUNITY 1, 17 (1976).
129 Griffith & Griffith, Racism, Psychological Injury, and Compensatory Dam-
ages, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 71, 75 (1986).
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criminatory behavior:"' 30
Blacks have clearly benefited from the judicial activism that
has resulted in the punishment of racism and the deterrence
of racist conduct. They have also profited from the willing-
ness of couris to recognize that racist conduct can produce
severe emotional distress. But greater psychiatric input
would result in a better assessment of emotional distress so
that plaintiffs can produce their evidence of psychological
damage in a more professional framework.'
As Part III discusses, this psychiatric input may be used to prove a
case of constructive discharge.
III. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
RESULTING FROM INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION:
PRECEDENTS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
This Comment's argument in favor of expanding the doctrine of
constructive discharge to recognize mental stress induced by discrimina-
tion in the workplace as an aggravating factor is not a radical departure
from current law. In the area of workmen's compensation, courts have
already allowed redress in causes of action based on emotional harm
from an emotional stimulus. 32
Case law in the workmen's compensation area provides helpful
guidance in identifying circumstances that should give rise to claims of
constructive discharge. This analogy does not address the psychological
pressures that resultfrom constructive discharge; 3' rather, it examines
psychological pressures as the cause of constructive discharge. The
analysis concludes that an employee should be able to establish that an
act of discrimination-for instance, an unlawful transfer-resulted in a
psychological injury, rendering her incapable of further tolerating the
130 Id.
131 Id.
... This Comment's proposal for a new standard for constructive discharge also
finds some support in the well-established recognition of a tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because this tort action also provides a remedy for psy-
chological injury from psychological stimulus and faces similar causation problems. Of
course, this tort requires intent, an element which this Comment's proposal seeks to
avoid. For a discussion of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Prosser, Inten-
tional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939);
Note, Torts: An Analysis of Mental Distress as an Element of Damages and as a
Basis of an Independent Cause of Action When Intentionally Caused, 20 WASHBURN
L.J. 106, 108-123 (1980).
... Studies have noted a relationship between mental disorders and unemploy-
ment. See B. O'BRIEN, PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK AND UNEMPLOYMENT 209-50 (1986).
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work environment. It should be irrelevant whether the unlawful trans-
fer was the direct cause of the discharge. All that should matter is that
the employer's discriminatory act in some way forced the plaintiff to
leave the workplace.
The comparison between workmen's compensation awards and
findings of constructive discharge reveals that a common problem
presents itself to plaintiffs in both types of cases: courts are far more
reluctant to grant relief for mental injuries caused by mental stimuli
than for physical injuries."" Early cases granting relief for mental in-
jury were limited to injury caused by the occurrence of a sudden, trau-
matic event. 3 5 More recently, courts have recognized mental injuries
caused by nonsudden emotional stimuli to be "injuries" under various
workmen's compensation statutes.' 36 The same standard used by the
courts in finding mental injuries in workmen's compensation claims can
be applied to psychological symptoms resulting from the intolerable
working conditions produced by discrimination.
In workmen's compensation cases, state courts have adopted two
standards for proving that a mental injury was caused by nontraumatic
elements in the workplace environment: the unusual-stress test and the
objective causal-connection test.' The former test, articulated in Swiss
Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Rela-
tions,'18 requires that the mental injury result from something more
than the normal stresses and tensions common to everyday worklife.'3 9
The latter test, articulated in McGarrah v. State Accident Insurance
Fund Corp., 40 requires a workmen's compensation claimant to prove
that the "employment conditions . . . were the 'major contributing
cause' of the mental disorder.'
4 1
The unusual-stress standard, if applied to constructive discharge
134 See Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual Stress in the Workplace,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 857 (1985).
135 Id. at 857-58.
1"6 See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. Hagen, 327 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1964)
(holding that plaintiff's condition of "abnormal stress" was precipitated by accumulated
conditions in the work environment); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
119 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555 (1978) (finding that the delegation to the plaintiff of exces-
sive responsibilities caused her unexpected mental breakdown); Royal State Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971) (hold-
ing that "an employee suffers a work-related injury . . . when he sustains a psycho-
genic disability precipitated by the circumstances of his employment").
137 See Comment, supra note 134, at 849.
... 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976).
139 Id. at 51, 240 N.W.2d at 130.
140 296 Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983).
141 Id. at 166, 675 P.2d at 171; see also Comment, supra note 134, at 851-53
(discussing the objective causal-connection test generally).
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claims, would require the claimant to establish that stress and tension
in the workplace be increased by the employer's discriminatory action
to such a level as to render the workplace intolerable. This standard,
like the existing reasonable person standard for constructive discharge,
would not aid in demonstrating constructive discharge from hidden dis-
crimination. It is likely that discriminatory failure to promote, unequal
pay, or transfer will be difficult to characterize as extraordinary condi-
tions in the workplace, in many cases leaving those types of discrimina-
tion outside the reach of an extraordinary stress standard for construc-
tive discharge.142
The causal-connection test is more applicable as a constructive dis-
charge standard for the purposes of this Comment. In a Title VII case,
the plaintiff would have to prove that she was constructively discharged
after incurring psychological injury caused by intolerable working con-
ditions grounded in discrimination. If such a claim could be established,
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover back pay from the date of the
constructive discharge. With the two-part causal-connection test, a vic-
tim of hidden discrimination can make out a cause of action for con-
structive discharge. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the stress-
ful conditions exist. 4 This condition can be met by demonstrating the
existence and the effects of institutional discrimination as discussed
above in Part II A and B. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the
discrimination was a "major contributing cause" of the mental disor-
der. 44 The establishment of this condition is demonstrated in the fol-
lowing cases in which psychiatric testimony established the causal con-
nection between the mental injury and the workplace-related mental
stimuli, including transfer, demotion, and reduction in pay.
In McGarrah v. State Accident Insurance Fund,45 a deputy
sheriff believed that his captain had a vendetta against him that was
demonstrated by transfer to a less desirable position and failure to pro-
mote. Consequently, the deputy became hostile and acutely depressed
and did not return to work. In reversing the Workers' Compensation
Board's denial of compensation, the court of appeals noted that psychi-
atric testimony demonstrated that the plaintiff's mental injury was the
result of a perceived vendetta and other workplace pressures and that
142 For a discussion of the burden of demonstrating that long-term emotional
stress produces damaging effects, see Note, Emotional Stress-Now a Cause of Com-
pensable Injury?, 34 LA. L. REV. 846 (1974).
143 See Comment, supra note 134, at 852 (discussing the casual-connection test in
the workmen's compensation context).
1" See McGarrah, 296 Or. at 166, 675 P.2d at 171 (applying casual-connection
test in the workmen's compensation context).
145 296 Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983).
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corroborating evidence supported the existence of an actual vendetta.14
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, approving the finding that the
actual stressful conditions of employment were a major contributing
cause of the plaintiff's mental disorder.'
Similarly, in Korter v. EBI Cos.,' 48 the court held that workmen's
compensation for temporary psychiatric disability was erroneously de-
nied an employee who suffered depression and anxiety after a demotion
caused him to lose self-confidence and become unsure of his authority
and of others' expectations . 49 The plaintiff met his burden of proof of
establishing the relationship between his disability and his employment
environment by the testimony of a psychiatrist, even though the psychi-
atrist did not state that employment conditions were the sole cause of
the plaintiff's problems.'
In Kelly's Case,'5' the Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed
a finding of compensable injury arising out of and in the course of
employment when an employee suffered an emotional breakdown upon
being informed that she was being laid off from one department and
transferred to another.' 52 The nexus between the mental injury and the
employment conditions was again established by psychiatric
testimony.' 53
Like the above workmen's compensation plaintiffs, a plaintiff in
Title VII case can put psychiatric testimony to the same use to demon-
strate that mental injury is an aggravating factor resulting from em-
ployment discrimination. In utilizing psychiatric testimony, this Com-
ment's proposal to broaden the standard for constructive discharge does
not introduce too much subjectivity. The court need not rely on the
subjective opinion of the plaintiff,'5 but can rely on expert psychiatric
148 See Matter of Compensation of McGarrah, 59 Or. App. 448, 451, 456, 651
P.2d 153, 155, 158 (1982), affd sub nom. McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund 296
Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983).
147 See McGarrah, 296 Or. at 166, 675 P.2d at 172.
148 46 Or. App. 43, 610 P.2d 312 (1980).
149 The plaintiff returned from vacation to find out that he had been replaced as
supervisor, had lost his secretary, and had been moved to a smaller office. Id. at 45, 610
P.2d at 313.
150 See id. at 48-51, 610 P.2d at 314-16.
15' 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582 (1985).
152 See id. at 684, 477 N.E.2d at 582-83.
1 53 See id. at 685-86, 477 N.E.2d at 583.
154 Indeed, a third test for demonstrating workplace-related mental stress in work-
men's compensation cases, allowing recovery for perceived, not necessarily real, unfa-
vorable employment conditions, has been rejected. See Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d
977, 981-84 (Alaska 1986) (discussing the different tests in workmen's compensation
law to prove emotional injury and selecting a "preliminary link" test requiring more
than the employee's subjective perception of her workplace as the source of her injury);
Comment, supra note 134, at 849 n.5. This degree of subjectivity could not occur in a
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evidence of an intolerable working condition and its manifestation as
mental injury.
CONCLUSION
The definition of constructive discharge under Title VII must be
broadened to encompass the negative effects of institutional discrimina-
tion and discriminatory conditions of employment such as unequal pay,
failure to promote, and discriminatory transfer. The discriminatory act
is, more often than not, shrouded in an unconscious prejudice that ad-
versely influences the subjective evaluation criteria upon which salary,
transfer, and promotion decisions are often based. Thus, courts need to
apply a subjective approach in the analysis of whether a Title VII
plaintiff has established intolerable working conditions.
The negative physical and psychological effects of inequities in sal-
aries, promotions, and transfers greatly affect all employees. When
these negative effects are the result of illegal discrimination, however,
Title VII should provide a remedy. These effects, already recognized as
significant by progressive courts in workmen's compensation claims, are
clear manifestations of how an employer's act can serve as an indirect
cause of a constructive discharge.
The recognition of the impact institutional discrimination can have
on minority and women employees reveals that many "voluntary resig-
nations" can be, in fact, discharges-the reasonable reactions of these
employees to intolerable working environments. Having recognized that
minorities and women still face pervasive, hidden, institutional discrim-
ination in the white male-dominated workplace, the courts should now
strive to achieve a broader recognition of what constitutes intolerable
working conditions and a more expansive definition of the constructive
discharge doctrine.
case of constructive discharge under Title VII because an actual Title VII violation
must underlie the constructive discharge claim.
1988]

